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DAVID MCDOWALL, COLIN LOFTIN, BRIAN WIERSEMA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Like most social issues involving firearms, the link between guns
and violence can be an emotional topic. If social scientists are to pro-
vide useful guidance in this area, it will be through careful data collec-
tion and logical analysis. While the tools of social science are limited,
over time the accumulation of its findings can establish a trustworthy
basis for understanding the issues.
Accordingly, we are pleased by the articles in this Symposium.
For the most part, each author closely attends to factual matters and
to consistent patterns in the available data.
Yet we believe that Professor Daniel Polsby's commentary is a par-
tial exception to this approach. Polsby's comments advocate a posi-
tion, building an argument for a conclusion that he favors. Polsby
makes his case politely and with grace. Still, in presenting his posi-
tion, he is often unfair to work that does not support it.
Polsby devotes much of his attention to our Article, Easing Con-
cealed Firearm Laws: Effects on Homicide in Three States. His discussion of
our Article is similar to other critiques, especially to a memorandum
by Paul H. Blackman, Research Coordinator for the National Rifle As-
sociation's lobbying arm.1 Because of the frequency of these criti-
cisms, we will consider them in detail.
Polsby raises three major issues about our article. Two of these
are empirical matters, and one is theoretical. We will address each
separately.
t Authors requested rebuttal [Eds].
* This research was supported by grant R49-CCR-306268 from the U.S. Public Health
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1 PAUL H. BiAcKMAN, INITmAL EVALUATION OF UNVERSITY OF MAPYI.AN/CDC STUDY OF
STATE RIGHT TO CARIR LAWS (1995).
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II. HOMICIDES IN MIAMI
First, Polsby notes that we studied twenty years of data for four
cities in our analysis, but only ten years of data for Miami. He says that
if we had examined twenty years of Miami data, we would have found
that firearms homicides declined there.
As we pointed out in our Article, Miami homicide counts were
relatively low before the May 1980 boaflift of refugees from Marial,
Cuba. Killings in the city then skyrocketed, and they remained at this
higher level through 1992.
Our research design compared homicide counts before and after
the 1987 shall issue law. If we had ignored the earlier boatlift, logic
suggests that we would have found an increase in Miami homicides
after the licensing policy began.
There are two ways to handle this problem. First, we might have
analyzed the entire twenty year period in Miami, allowing for the ef-
fects of the boatlift. Second, we might have begun the Miami analysis
after the effects of the boatlift had worked themselves out.
We thought that the second strategy was more conservative, and
we employed it in our Article. We now report results using the first
strategy in Table 1. This analysis includes intervention models for the
Marial boatlift and for the shall issue law, and it uses all 240 months
between January 1973 and December 1992.
The estimates in Table 1 show large increases in Miami homicides
following the boatlift. As in our original analysis, firearm homicides
increased after the shall issue law, while other homicides fell. The
major difference from the earlier results is that the increase in fire-
arms homicides is now statistically significant.
Based on this analysis, we would conclude that firearms homi-
cides significantly increased in four of the five cities that we studied,
rather than in only three. An analysis of all 240 months of Miami data
thus strengthens the original conclusions.
III. HOMICIDES IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Polsby's second point is that homicides decreased statewide after
Florida's shall issue law began. He says that because we examined
only three Florida cities, we reached mistaken conclusions about the
general effects of the state's law.
This point actually raises two issues. First, how could we find that
firearms homicides increased in three cities if they declined statewide?
Second, why did we use cities to study a state law?
The first issue is a matter of data selection. Most claims about
decreases in Florida homicide rates compare only two years, 1987 (the
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year the law began) and a single year after the law. Invariably, the
year after the law is 1991 or later.
According to our data, Florida's firearms homicide rate was 7.98
per 100,000 persons in 1987. The 1988 rate was 9.54, the 1989 rate
was 8.52, and the 1990 rate was 8.18. By 1991, the rate was 7.19-
below that in 1987-and in 1992, it was 6.86.
Thus, for three years after the law, Florida witnessed higher rates
of firearms homicide. Only in 1991 and later years did gun homicides
dip below their 1987 level. Claims of a decrease in homicides thus
depend on using data from 1991 or later for comparison.
Yet, as we noted in our Article, Florida began background checks
and a waiting period for handgun purchases in 1991. Comparisons
that use only 1991 or later years thus confound the effects of shall
issue licensing with those of the other two laws. A decrease in homi-
cides after 1991 might as easily be due to the background checks or
waiting period as to the licensing policy.
Our basic research design used 240 monthly observations, with
no gaps over twenty years. The research design for the other compari-
sons used two annual observations, with large gaps. Our research de-
sign is reasonably strong, while the design in the other comparisons is
very weak. We encourage readers who doubt these points to consult
the sources that we cited in our Article.
Besides the comparison periods, there also is the issue of why we
studied the Florida law separately in each of three cities. Simply, we
thought that this approach was the most reasonable way to examine
the outcome of the licensing policy.
The three Florida cities in our analysis are geographically sepa-
rated, and they differ in their demographic makeup. Each city thus
provided a separate chance to test the law's effects. Indeed, the differ-
ence in the Miami results from those in the other areas raised ques-
tions that might otherwise have gone unnoticed.
Although we believe that the city analysis is more useful, we pres-
ent results for the entire state in Table 2. This analysis includes inter-
vention models for the shall issue policy and for the background
check and waiting period laws. It covers the period between 1983 and
1992.
The first panel of Table 2 cofitains estimates of the effects of the
policies on monthly homicide counts. The second panel contains esti-
mates of their effects on annual homicide rates. Both panels show
that firearm homicides significantly increased statewide after the shall
issue law began. The only major difference from the city results is that
homicides without guns significantly decreased in the state after the
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law. Thus, while we prefer the city analysis, estimates for the state lead
to similar conclusions.
IV. How SHALL ISSUE LAws MAY AFFECT HOMICIDES
Polsby's third point is a theoretical issue. We noted in our Article
that there is no evidence showing that legal firearms carriers use their
weapons to commit crimes. We suggested instead that shall issue laws
may give criminal offenders more incentive to carry and use guns for
protection from victims. That is, relaxed concealed firearm laws may
set off an arms race in which criminals obtain guns to protect against
victims who obtained guns to protect against criminals.
Polsby is skeptical of this explanation. He says that our logic also
implies that criminals will carry guns to protect themselves from the
police, a possibility he believes to be "farfetched." He suggests instead
that fear of armed citizens may discourage criminal gun carrying.
We cannot show beyond doubt that our theory is correct. The
rare involvement of permit holders in crime is an important issue, and
it deserves emphasis. As we stressed in the Article, additional study in
other areas is necessary before drawing firm conclusions about shall
issue laws.
Yet some theories accord better with the data than do others. In
presenting his theory, Polsby overlooked a way to test it against our
explanation.
In particular, in a survey of prison inmates, Wright and Rossi
asked criminals why they carried guns. Thirty percent of regular gun
carriers said that armed police officers were a "very" or "somewhat"
important reason for their actions.2 Sixty-two percent of regular carri-
ers cited armed victims as a "very" or "somewhat" important reason.3
These findings suggest two conclusions. First, some criminals do
carry guns to protect themselves from the police. Second, armed vic-
tims are a major reason for criminal carrying. Wright and Rossi con-
clude that "the possibility of confronting an armed victim appears to
have been a more important motivator in the felon's decision to carry
a weapon than the fact that the police have guns."4 Shall issue laws
thus may have a uniquely strong influence on criminal firearm use.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We believe that an essential difference between advocacy and sci-
ence lies in openness to the evidence. Although we disagree with
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most of Polsby's criticisms of our work (and the work of others), we
readily agree that our findings are not beyond dispute. As Polsby
notes, we (and other authors) do not draw unalterable conclusions.
Instead, we point to areas where further study may help clarify the
issues. We believe that such study will ultimately be more useful than
arguments in support of a preexisting opinion.
MCDOWALL, LOFITI, & WERSEMA [Vol. 86
Table 1
CHANGE IN MEAN NUMBER OF HOMICIDES PER MONTH IN FLORIDA, BY
METHOD, AFTER MARIAL BOATLIFT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SHALL
ISSUE LICENSING
Type of Change After the Shall Change After the Marial
Homicide Issue Law* Boatift**
Coefficient SE t-Statistic Coefficient SE t-Statistic
Firearm 6.76 3.40 1.99 15.57 3.47 4.49
Other Methods -1.59 0.83 -1.92 4.15 0.76 5.46
* Mean change in homicides after implementation of the shall issue law, controlling for the
Marial boatlift.
** Mean change in homicides after the Marial boatlift, controlling for the shall issue law.
Table 2
CHANGE IN MEAN NUMBER OF HOMICIDES PER MONTH IN FLORIDA, BY
METHOD, AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SHALL ISSUE LICENSING AND
WAITING PERIOD AND BACKGROUND CHECK LAWS
Series and Type Change After the Shall Change After Waiting Period
of Homicide Issue Law* and Background Check Laws**
Coefficient SE t-Statistic Coefficient SE t-Statistic
Monthly Counts
Firearm 18.13 2.38 7.62 -13.93 3.02 -4.61
Other Methods -5.32 2.43 -2.19 -11.08 2.96 -3.74
Annual Rates Per
100,000 Residents
Firearm .88 0.26 3.38 -1.72 0.32 -5.37
Other Methods -1.11 0.32 -3.47 -1.17 0.40 -2.92
* Mean change in homicides after implementation of the shall issue law, controlling for the
waiting period and background check laws.
** Mean change in homicides after implementation of the background check and waiting
period laws, controlling for the shall issue law.
